Looking for fat pitches

As I was Re-listening to the 1996 Berkshire Q&A, it struck me again how GOOD the idea to look for those fat pitches is. It resonates with the fact that an investor needs only a few great ideas to produce a great track record.

There is no need to swing on everything, but instead look for the things that are in your circle of competence, and then swing for the fences when such an idea shows itself.

The hard thing is also to know what to do when waiting for such opportunities. I think the most important thing is to KEEP LOOKING. It’s probably easy to just give up and buy whatever is popular at whatever valuation, because “everything is expensive” etc. I guess we as investors just have to keep looking. There is always money to be made somewhere, right?

A second question to answer is what to do with your money while you are looking for those fat pitches? Here I might be slightly hypocritical, because what I do is stick some of my excess cash into an index fund, so it earns at least market returns. In some sense this is doing what I just spoke of in the paragraph above, “buying whatever is popular at whatever price”. But I think putting some of my excess cash position in a broad low cost index fund isn’t a too bad idea for me. Since my alternative cost of capital is whatever return I would be getting on my money elsewhere, why not put some of my excess cash position into that? This also pushes me to always compare whatever case I’m looking at with the broader index. Is it of higher quality, is it cheaper, and do I think it will earn a higher return over time?

Remember that you need very few great hits to be a fantastic investor. The hard thing is not to act stupidly while waiting for such pitches, AND to correctly identify a stellar opportunity, AND not to forget to bring a washtub if such an opportunity arises!

Cheers, over and out!

Short on shorting

Every now and then I see one or two questions regarding shorting stocks, and I thought I’d put down some of my thoughts.

First of all, shorting can work for some, for short time periods, but when shorting you are inherently fighting an uphill battle for a few reasons. In order to fully understand these, we should first make sure we understand what shorting is.

Shorting, going short, or short selling stocks (or other financial instruments) is a position that’s negatively correlated with the price of the asset. In normal language, that means a short position is a bet the the price will go down in the future. In practice, this position is achieved by borrowing shares of a stock, then selling them, netting you cash in hand today plus a debt in a number of shares.

Reason 1: Unfavourable risk-reward

When buying a stock (“going long”) the potential upside is thousands of percent, while in the worst case scenario the business goes bankrupt in one day and your shares are worthless. In other words the largest downside (assuming no leverage) is -100%. When shorting however, this risk-reward is flipped on its head. In the best case scenario the business goes to zero tomorrow and you can repay your loaned shares with nothing. In other words, the best case upside is 100%. As you might have guessed by now, the maximum downside is theoretically infinite.

Reason 2: Time works against you

Since you are borrowing shares, you have to pay interest. This causes the value of the position to decrease with time, even if the price of the shares does not increase. This negative correlation with time can make the position a losing position even if the share price falls. On the other hand, your time cost on a long position is the alternative cost of capital over the holding period. Thus, you do not face the built in headwind of interest cost on your position when you buy a stock.

Reason 3: Everybody else want your position to fail

The final and most important point, is that all stakeholders related to the business will want it to succeed. Of course, shareholders want the stock price to increase and thus your short position declining. All lenders to the company all want their loan paid back, with interest, so they too want the business to succeed. The board of directors and the management team all want to make money, so they too want the business to succeed. Finally, most of the customers will want deliverance of their goods, and the suppliers want to both keep their client and get paid for whatever goods or services they have delivered. In other words, they too want the business to succeed.

In summary, shorting is incredibly difficult because of these three aspects. If you really want to bet on the price of a stock falling, or hedge some position, put options can be a better alternative than straight up shorting shares. This is of course only given that your position size is large enough to warrant the fees. If we instead inverse these three reasons, we get some good reasons why to be long biased. All this said, I usually like knowing what the short sellers are betting on in any of my positions, and what their reasons are. In most cases, they are smart individuals and may have found something I missed. Over and out.

Charlie Munger’s Investing Checklist

In an interview with BBC, Charlie Munger outlines a checklist for Berkshire investments. It takes him about a minute to run thorough it, but it contains a wealth of information. In this post I hope to dig into the four point Charlie Munger names. The interview can be found here. Charlie names the list about 6 minutes into the video, and it is outlined below.

  • We have to deal with things we are capable of understanding.
  • We have to have a business with some intrinsic characteristics that give it a durable competitive advantage.
  • We would vastly prefer a management in place with a lot of talent and integrity.
  • Finally no matter how wonderful it is its not worth an infinite price. so we have to have a price that makes sense, and gives a margin of safety considering the natural vicissitudes of life.

Being Charlie, he of course rounds it  off with how obvious and simple it is. Also saying the simpleness of it is the reason it hasn’t been copied, even though it has been “out there” for decades.

Simplifying this list once more, I would argue, gives us “Buy quality companies at reasonable prices”. Lots of investors out there claim that they are looking for quality companies, but are unable to put “quality” into other words, or in numbers. This is why I think it valuable to take a good hard look at this list, and what it means and how we can find such companies.

We have to deal with things we are capable of understanding.

This one seems incredibly obvious, but still most of us tend to dabble in stocks in a large number of sectors and industries. I’m not saying that is necessarily stupid, but do we really have the capability of understanding all kinds of companies?

Another interesting bit in this sentence is the word “capable”. We don’t need to know every single in and out of the specific industry, but we must at least have the capability of understanding it. This is the reason why Berkshire have opted out of most of the high tech businesses. This is probably applicable to their holding in Apple. Even though they have opted out of most of the tech businesses, the largest holding is Apple. Apple to most of us is a tech-company, right? I think Warren has re-framed Apple to be a consumer products company, which he and charlie are capable of understanding.

Finally, if we don’t meet the potential investment does not pass this first filter, we are clearly unable to evaluate the next three points on the list.

We have to have a business with some intrinsic characteristics that give it a durable competitive advantage

This point is what I think many investors usually refer to a moat. However, I don’t think most investors have really thought about this statement, what constitutes a moat, and how to find  companies that have a moat? For now, I’ll leave the discussion on what kinds of moats there are, and skip ahead one step. I would argue that companies which have strong moats are able to earn more money than companies who do not have those same moats. That is relatively obvious, but how does that manifest itself? Margins and ROIC. I would state that companies with moats will be able to have higher margins, for a longer period of time. This includes margins all throughout the  income statement: gross margin, operating margin, and net profit margins. This also lets the company earn a larger percent of its revenues in operating cash flow. These higher margins, should also help the company earn a larger return on their invested capital for a longer period.

Finding companies with a moat

Unfortunately we can’t simply screen for “moat”, but we can screen for margins and ROIC! Therefore, sorting through a list of companies who enjoy high margins and have a high ROIC, you might find a few companies that turn out to have a strong moat.

Why do we care about moats?

What we as shareholders care about in an investment are future cash flows. Before there can be cash flow to you as the shareholder, there has to be revenues, and those revenues have to be larger than the sum of all cash expenses. The moat does several things to further this agenda, for example, it lets companies keep prices higher than if there would be no moat. Higher prices equal more revenues, without increased costs. The moat is what enables the business to fight competition, and in turn protect its margins and its return on invested capital.

We would vastly prefer a management in place with a lot of talent and integrity

Given that the two preceding points are met, if the company has incapable and dishonest managers the company is likely doomed anyway. Stupid managers might not realise their own moat, and thus neglect to service it. Thus allowing competitors a chance to build a moat of their own, surpassing this once fantastic business.

Management can play an integral part of creating value in a business. The right manager in the right business can make billion for themselves and for their shareholders. Meanwhile, poor management in a decent business can end in ruin. Unfortunately, discerning the good from the bad is not an easy task.

Some things one might use in order to determine management capability and honesty are their track record, and how you perceive them in their letters, announcements, or interviews. This is one part of investing that is closer to art than science in according to me, and note that many managers do not write their own CEO comments to the reports. Some do, but my guess is that most don’t. One thing I look for when trying to asses the managers honesty is how much of their comments is just fluff, and how much is “real”. I try to create my own narrative of what happened the past quarter or year, and what I think the company should focus on going forward, and then compare that to what the manager is saying. Furthermore, does management admit mistakes, and do a good analysis of what went wrong and how it will be prevented from happening again. And finally, are they correctly assessing the reason for the positive things that happened, or are they simply assigning it all to their own brilliance and genius?

No matter how wonderful it is its not worth an infinite price

Buying a 100-dollar bill is only a great idea if you can buy it for less than 100 dollars. In other words, a great business can make for a horrible investment if you pay too much for it. The opposite is not true for a bad business.

After a good, or maybe even a great business has been identified, with strong competitive advantages and an able and honest management, we want to buy it. But if we want to make it a good investment we should be very careful not to pay too much for it!

Mr Munger does not say what a good price is, and neither does Mr Buffett, but we know that its relative. When using multiples, the fair multiple varies with the industry, the predicted future growth rate, and the predicted future return on invested capital. In other words, a multiple that is too high for one business might be a great price for another. Its not easy, and it shouldn’t be. What I do is in general, that I use a multiple, and I compare it to what I think the future growth and ROIC will be. Then I also make rough comparisons to peers, in order to see how its priced compared to competitors.

As Aswath Damodaran says, valuation is a skill best learnt by practising. So go practice!

Final remarks

I really like this list of criteria Charlie has for us here. Its short and relatively high level, while each point can be elaborated on for pages and pages on end! They are a decent starting point for aspiring investors to start looking for in businesses, and its something I try to look for in the stocks that I buy.

As the final section, I want to summarise the list in one sentence: Find businesses you can understand, that has some competitive advantages and an able and honest management at the helm. Then buy it without paying too much and sit on it until something better comes along.

I hope you enjoyed this post, we owe a lot to Charlie Munger and Warren Buffett and I am forever thankful for them sharing so much knowledge and wisdom!

Analysis of Catella


Catella is a relatively small corporate finance, real estate investment manager, and hedge/mutual fund manager focused on the Nordic market.


This is an interesting case because Catella are currently winding down some of their businesses, namely Banking (wind down to be completed in Q1-2 2021) and Catella Fondförvaltning AB (CFF). This is why Catella might be a special situation, and those can often be mispriced by the market.

Business description

Currently Catella is divided into three parts: Corporate Finance, Property Investment Management, and Funds. Catella also has a banking business which is being divested and reported separately. According to IFRS this segment is not included in group figures.


Catella are active in most of Europe, with offices also in Hong Kong and New York.

Case description

The thesis in this case is that the wind down of some of the parts in Catella can let the value in other parts of Catella be shown. With the wind down of Banking and Catella Fondförvaltning, Catella are now focusing on real estate and property management. This simplification and scaling down of business can let Catella have a better focus, which might give better future returns.

The parts in brief

Catella’s Corporate Finance department provides capital market and advisory services on property related transactions.

The Property Investment Management part focuses on property investments, offering professional investors exposure through property funds, asset management services, and through property management in the early phase of property development.

The Fund business offers actively managed funds with a focus on the Nordics, and systemic funds with a global focus. This is split into Catella Fondförvaltning (CFF) which handles the mutual funds, and Informed Portfolio Management (IPM) which deals with systematic funds.

Catella also has a banking segment that is being wound down and is being sold off since september 2018. Catella reports this segment separately according to IFRS as a disposal group held for sale.

The Parts in numbers

In the latest quarterly report, Catella reports two segments: Corporate finance, and asset management. See this formulation in the report: “Catella
has defined Corporate Finance (consisting of the Corporate Finance operating segment) and Asset Management (consisting of the combined Property Investment
Management, Equity, Hedge and Fixed Income Funds, and Banking operating segments), as the Group’s reportable segments”.

Here is a condensed income statement for the segments from the Q1 report, with some of the main points highlighted.


From this overview we see that the corporate finance carries a loss, and that the profits come from the funds and property management. Furthermore, I notice a large decline in operating profits in the fund business, that is largely compensated by an increase in the property management side.

The value of the parts

Corporate Finance
This seems like the least valuable part in Catella. It has way lower margins and several quarters with a net loss in the segment. Furthermore, CEO Knut Pedersen indicates that transaction volumes are way down in the wake of the global pandemic. Depending on how flexible Catella can be with regards to their costs in the segment, I expect the second quarter of 2020 to be very bad for Catella’s corporate finance segment. For Q2 I’m going to assume a decline in revenue in Corporate Finance of another 20%, with the same cost basis of Q1. This gives us 87 m SEK in revenues and costs of 125 m SEK, leading to an operating profit of -37.8 m SEK. Assuming some sort of return to normal for Q3 and Q4 in this segment, let’s assume 10 m in Q3 and 20 m in Q4. This lands us on an operating profit for the rest of 2020 in Corporate Finance of about -8 m SEK.

The funds also show some unfortunate signs, and in the CEOs statement Pedersen tells us that the fund segment has been seeing outflows in the first quarter. Catella had a decrease in assets under management of 23 Bn SEK in Q1, leaving them with a total AUM of 48 Bn SEK. For the fund business we are not given any guidance regarding Q2, but I am going to assume no abnormal outflows or inflows in the remaining fund business. The total income for funds totalled 57 m SEK in Q1, however the sale of CFF makes this segment really tricky.

According to the announcement related to the sale, 70% of  CFF is sold for 126-154 m SEK with an option to sell the remaining 30% for 60 m SEK in January 2022. With the argument of conservatism, I’m going to assume a price that lands at 130 m and that the option is exercised. Discounting the sale price of 60 m in Jan 2022 with a 10% discount rate we get a present value of ~50 m SEK. This gives a total sale value of 180 m SEK for CFF. However the fun does not end there. Because of this transaction, a write down of 70 m SEK will be incurred in the second half of 2020. Finally, Catella expects an effect on earnings of -13 m to +15 m SEK. Again, in the name of conservatism I’m going with the lower end of this spectrum and assuming a loss of 10 m SEK. This leaves us with a one-time net effect of +100 m SEK after the sale of CFF.

Note that this sale does not include Informed Portfolio Management (IPM) which is the second fund company under the fund segment in Catella. In the Q1 report Systematic funds amounted to 100 m in revenue. applying the same operating margin for the whole segment in Q1 we should get that IPM provides 35 m SEK in operating profit. Apparently most of the decline year-over-year happened in the systematic funds, which is why I’m going to assume no growth in this segment for the remaining quarters. Note that Catella’s total ownership in IPM is 60.6%, thus the estimated operating earnings benefiting Catella are roughly 22 m per quarter for 2020.

Property management

This is the only segment that shows an increase in assets under management. The AUM was 108.5 Bn SEK, an increase of 8.5 Bn since Q4 2019, and the operating profit for this segment as 41 m SEK in Q1. compare this to the same quarter last year which sported 141 m SEK in income and a big zero in operating profit. Looking at the operating profit per quarter since 2018 we can see that Q2 seems to be the significantly largest contributor to operating profit in this segment. The reasons seem to be large variable incomes from their European residential fund. I have a really hard time estimating the income for this segment, so I’m going to assume the same development for operating income as in 2019 but 20% lower in Q2 and 10% lower in Q3 and Q4. This gives us about 53 m SEK in Q2, 13.5 m SEK in Q3 and 21.5 in Q4.

One-off items are mainly the sale of CFF which is mentioned above, but also the finalisation of the wind down of the Banking segment. According to the pm that the wind-down will be completed, Catella estimated that 350 m SEK of value will benefit Catella when the process is complete, and 80 m SEK of costs will be reserved in Q2. The wind-down is estimated to be completed in the first half of 2021.

Catella also have a bunch of interesting investments on their balance sheet that should be mentioned. Consider this asset side of the balance sheet from the Q1 reports.br.PNG

Some of these investments are analysed below, they are all described in Notes 3, 4, and 5 in the Q1 report.

The property developments carried on the balance sheet at a value of 428 m + 90 m SEK. There are four residential projects, three in Germany and one in Denmark, briefly summarised below:

  • Name, expected transaction volume, started on, further plans/process
  • Grand Central, 500 M Eur, 2015, divestment ongoing. Expected effect on Q2 earnings +155 m SEK, which i have taken into account in the estimates above.
  • Seestadt MG+, 700 M Eur, 2017, producing blueprints.
  • Düssel-Terrassen, 250 M Eur, 2018, producing blueprints.
  • Kaktus, 130 M Eur, 2017, construction initiated, plan to finish and divest asap.
  • Announced 250 m SEK investment in logistics property, estimated construction start in Sept 2020

The first thing I note is that most of these are really far out in the future. There are no time estimates, but only Grand Central seems to be under divestment currently. I am not a specialist in building, but there can probably be several years from blueprint to finished project, and in most of these projects the blueprints are not even finished.


The loan portfolio contains securitised European loans primarily exposed to housing. The portfolio is carried at a value of 123 m SEK. This loan portfolio has, as far as I can tell, not performed well at all. Out of nine loans, six have been written down to a value of zero. The remaining loans have a weighted a duration of 3.8 years. There seems to be an option for the issuer to repurchase the loans Lusitano 5 for nominal value 3.3 m EUR, which according to Catella would cause an  impairment of 2 m EUR. The odds of the issuer exercising the option is estimated to increase in Q2 2021 according to Catella. I’m going to assume Catella’s assumptions are correct and that the loan portfolio is correctly valued. It should be noted that only Pastor 2 is expected to have cash flow in 2020. This stated, I assign no positive or negative value to the loan portfolio, but let it be as is. In other words, no write ups or write downs in 2020, and noting the expected 20 m SEK (2 m EUR) impairment in 2021.

Adding it all together


Lets add everything stated above into this rough projection of operating and other profits. This gives us expected operating profits plus some one offs totalling 158.5 m SEK. Catella managed to pay an amazing 47% in taxes for 2019, and judging from the tax in the first quarter of 2020 it seems like they are still paying close to that amount. This lands us on roughly 84 m SEK of net profits for 2020. If we use a slightly lower but still high tax rate of 30% we get 111 m SEK in net profit. (Edit: The reason Catella pay such a large percentage in tax is due to gains in some countries that cant be netted against losses in other countries.)

There are way too many things that can happen before 2021, so I won’t make a prognosis that far out.


With a price per share at 21, the current market cap is 1370 m SEK, and current EV is 1120 m SEK (86.3 m shares outstanding)


EPS with 47% tax is 0.97 SEK, and with 30% tax it’s 1.28 (2020e).

This gives us P/E(2020e) 21 and EV/E(2020e) is 16 using a 47% tax rate. with 30% tax the P/E is just above 16 and the EV/E is just above 12.


Phew, this is a big one. First of all, some remarks: it’s messy and there are many things going on at the same time. Here is a summary list of things going on:

  1. Several divestments of relatively large sections of the business are ongoing.
  2. The property projects are really far out in the future.
  3. Catella are paying unnaturally high taxes.
  4. The Corporate finance segment is not doing that well, and should be hit very hard by Covid-19.
  5. The funds are seeing declining AUM.
  6. Lots of management changes (CEO leaves Nov 2019, CFO leaves Dec 2019, Chairman appointed CEO and a new interim CFO and a new interim chairman is appointed in March 2020. That CFO quit in June 2020.)
  7. Largest owner is an investment company, Claesson & Anderzén (acting CEO Johan Claesson). Other notable owners are Strawberry Capital (Petter Stordalen), and M2 Asset Management (Rutger Arnhult). Acting chairman also has stocks and bonds in Catella)
  8. Lots of cash and short term assets on the balance sheet (925 m cash minus 108 m pledged funds.) Also might be reduced by another 500 m due to an investment in a logistics facility announced in June. (Correction, after a short email to IR this has been clarified. Catellas part in this investment is 50%, so their investment is 250 m SEK, not 500 m SEK as I previously stated.)

The conclusion is that Catella is cheap, and that there are lots and lots of uncertainties. First the divestments have to go according to plan without incurring extra costs. Secondly, a permanent CFO and possibly a permanent CEO has to be found. Finally, the property investments have to be completed and moved to management or be sold off.

There is also the possibility that Catella can lower the very high tax-rate closer to 21,4% which is the Swedish tax rate on corporate earnings, which will have a large impact on the net earnings. Even if they reduce the effective tax rate to 30% this will have a huge effect on net earnings.

My analysis leads me to believe that there might be a turning point in the relatively near future. As more and more “non-property-related” businesses are being divested, more and more focus can be brought to refining and growing the property management business. In conclusion, Catella looks like a fairly priced bet given the current question marks, but as more and more things get figured out, the risk gets lower, and the potential upside  increases. These estimates are in my view quite conservative, and with some tailwind Catella are likely to perform way better than my estimations. There are however quite some years ahead before I would label Catella a great business. If Catella manages to stabilise and build this up to start showing stable annual returns, good returns are sure to come. It’s VERY important to note that there are several stones that must fall into place before any of that can happen!

Note that my estimates and prognoses are very conservative, and a small positive deviation from my prognosis will have large effects on the bottom line. Main point is that I do not calculate the properties under development apart from the estimation made by Catella regarding Grand Central.

I think Catella is a fairly priced bet, that has large potential for future profits. However this requires good cost control and streamlining in the coming years.

I own shares of Catella, and nothing I write should be taken as financial advice, and nothing you read here should be taken as a fact. Do not make any investment decision based on what you read here, always do your own research.

Sources: Catella press releases and financial reports, Börsdata.

Some edits that have been done based on feedback:

  • Catella does not own 100% of IPM, Catella owns 60.6% of IPM according to note 20 in the annual report 2019.
  • I did not deduct group overhead (costs were 20 m SEK for Q1, and I’m assuming them to stay the same for the rest of 2020)
  • Claesson & Anderzén is owned by the acting CEOs holding, so insider ownership is very significant.
  • EV is way too high since is not adjusted for divestments
  • Explanation for tax

Kort Analys av INVISIO


Bolaget utvecklar och levererar specialiserad kommunikationsutrustning för militär personal. Kunder är till exempel militär, polis, brandkår, och säkerhetsbranschen.

  • Börsvärde: 6.8 miljarder SEK
  • Enterprise value: 6.9 miljarder SEK
  • ROIC: 45%
  • EV/EBIT: 45
  • Omsättningstillväxt 5-år CAGR: ~20%


Enligt årsrapporten 2019 håller bolaget på med följande: “INVISIO develops and sells advanced communication systems with hearing protection that enable professionals in noisy and mission-critical environments to communicate and work effectively. The systems give operational advantages and increased security for the users, such as military, police and security personnel. Protection against hearing loss helps to reduce individual suffering and costs to society”

Enligt samma rapport står Europeiska och Amerikanska försvarsindustrin för ca 90% av omsättningen, men man menar att stort intresse finns inom brottsbekämpning och andra geografiska områden.

Beskrivning av caset

Bolaget har mycket goda marginaler och hög ROIC. En tes skulle kunna vara ökad oro leder till mer behov av militär och polis i fält som har behov av INVISIOs produkter.

Bolagets Kvalité

Kollar man på Börsdata ser det onekligen ut som att bolaget är av mycket hög kvalité.


INVISIO har mycket goda marginaler och fantastiskt hög avkastning på investerat kapital. Bolaget har dessutom en sakta men säkert ökande bruttomarginal.


Därtill kan vi lägga en mycket stark balansräkning, med väldigt lite immateriella tillgångar och låg skuldsättning.

Dock ska man notera att bolaget verkar stundvis drabbas av otroligt dåliga kvartal, exempelvis Q1-2019 var rörelseresultatet rasade till nära noll.


Att bolaget verkar ha hög kvalité är jag tydligen inte ensam om att tycka, då INVISIO är väldigt högt värderat. EV/EBIT 46 är inte särskilt billigt. I relation till tillväxten i EBIT som är ca 25% årligt de senaste 5 åren får vi en (EV/EBIT)/EBIT-tillväxt multipel på drygt 1.8.

Givet bolagets höga lönsamhet och snabba tillväxt är de antagligen värda en premie jämfört med ett index. Eftersom man handlar med stater och deras försvarsbudgetar ligger det eventuellt mycket politisk risk i caset, och det tycker jag man bör ha i åtanke. Eftersom en stat, kommun, eller liknande inte handlar eller genomför affärer på exakt samma sätt som ett “vanligt” företag kan det hända att inköp varierar mer.


Tar man de otroligt fina marginalerna och ROIC in i beräkningarna, plus den starka balansräkningen tycker jag spontant att EV/EBIT 30-35 ser attraktivt ut. Jag ser således inte någon säkerhetsmarginal i nuvarande värdering. Anledningen att jag vill ha bolaget till en lägre multipel än vad som erbjuds idag är dels den politiska risken, och dels att man militären som motpart. Jag kan med andra ord inte ha lika bra koll eller förståelse exakt hur kunderna (försvaret/militären) agerar. Jag antar att de drivs oerhört hårt av budget och sittande regering, och således inte av deras “faktiska” behov. Något som är positivt är att INVISIO verkar försöka diversifiera sin kundbas, men samma gäller såklart polis och annan statlig verksamhet. Den bransch jag ser som skulle agera mest “marknadsmässigt” är antagligen säkerhetsbranschen, men det är inte tydligt hur snabbt bolaget expanderar till de branscherna.

För att summera, oerhört bra lönsamhet och stark balansräkning. Man verkar inom en knepig bransch, och värderingen lämnar inte väldigt mycket margin of safety.

Jag äger inte aktier i INVISIO i skrivande stund.

Global Momentum

Nyligen har jag börjat ett litet test för att komplettera min globala indexexponering. Inspirationen kom delvist från mitt egna intresse i kvantitativa strategier, och dels från FondSmurfen och Nicklas och Fabians superbra podd MarketMakers.

Ni kan läsa mer på Börslabbet av Henning Hammar, länk här: Global Trendföljning.

Tanken är väldigt simplifierat att man investerar i de fonder som gått bäst den senaste perioden. De andelsklasser jag valt att använda som utgångspunkt är följande:

  • Aktier
    • Geografiskt
      • USA
      • Europa
      • Asien
      • Japan
      • Emerging markets
      • Norge
      • Finland
      • Danmark
    • Bransch
      • Fastigheter
      • Finans
      • Medicals
      • Tech
    • Small cap
  • Råvaror
    • Guld och ädelmetaller
    • Övrigt
  • Räntor
    • Euro government bonds

Tanken är att det ska vara en stor spridning av tillgångsslag som presterar olika bra i olika investeringsklimat. När sentimentet slår om bör trenden indikera det och strategin bör leda till att man flyttar till de tillgångar som presterar bättre.

I dagsläget använder jag följande fonder för att nå dessa olika tillgångsslag:

  • Aktier
    • Geografi
      • Nordnet Indexfond Norge
      • Nordnet Indexfond Finland
      • Nordnet Indexfond Danmark
      • Nordnet Indexfond Europa
      • Nordnet Indexfond Global
      • Nordnet Indexfond  USA
      • Swedbank Robur Access Asien
      • Swedbank Robur Access Japan
    • Bransch
      • DNB Finans
      • IKC Fastighetsfond
      • Swedbank Robur Fastighet A
      • Swedbank Robur Medical
      • Swedbank Robur Ny Teknik
      • Lannebo Teknik
      • OPM Listed Private Equity A
    • Small cap
      • AMF Aktiefond Tillväxtmarknader
      • Didner & Gerge Small & Microcap
      • Didner & Gerge US Small & Microcap
      • Handelsbanken GI Småbolag Ind Cri A1
      • Swedbank Robur Small Cap EM
  • Råvaror
    • Guld och ädelmetaller
      • BGF World Gold A2
      • Pacific Precious A
    • Övrigt
      • Handelsbanken Råvarufond A1
      • Swedbank Robur Råvarufond
  • Räntor
      • FIM Euro

Tanken är att testa detta så länge jag har lust, som komplement till min övriga indexexponering. För mer info rekommenderar jag Hennings texter på Börslabbet, FondSmurfens twitterflöde, och MarketMakers poddavsnitt som Henning gästar. Avsnittet hittas här: #104 Global Trendföljande m. Investerarfysikern

Just nu har jag lite under 10% av min portfölj placerad enligt detta. Jag fördelar beloppet lika mellan de tre tillgångarna som presterat bäst den senaste tiden. Just det måttet är något som jag fortfarande håller på att fundera på hur jag ska mäta, men nu använder jag en månad och väger in lite av tre månaders avkastning.

Hoppas detta ger inspiration att testa något liknande, jag kommer antagligen uppdatera detta beroende på hur det går framöver. Over and out.

Analys av NOTE


NOTE har nyligen släppt en riktigt fin rapport, så jag tänkte att det är dags att jag tar en djupare titt på bolaget. De har länge legat på min bevakningslista, eftersom de tickar de flesta av mina boxar, hög lönsamhet, ok marginaler, och bra tillväxt.

  • Börsvärde: 1,9 mdr SEK
  • EV/EBITDA: 10
  • Omsättningstillväxt snitt 5 år: 11%
  • ROIC: 32%
  • Rörelsemarginal: 7,5%


“NOTE is a leading northern European manufacturing partner with an international platform for manufacturing electronics-based products that require high technology competence and flexibility through product lifecycles.”

NOTE är alltså en underleverantör av elektroniska komponenter verksamma inom Europa. Det verkar vara fokus på att produkterna vara högteknologiska. Jag tycker bolaget beskriver sin verksamhet mycket väl i senaste kvartalsrapporten:

“NOTE is one of the most expansive and competitive electronics manufacturers in the Nordics, and a stable business partner for Swedish and international customers that need advanced EMS solutions. NOTE’s business model is based on long-term customer relationships and partnerships. NOTE sells to a large customer base, essentially active across industry, communication, medtech, defence and high end consumer electronics. Its customer base includes large global corporations active world-wide, and local enterprises whose sales are mainly in northern Europe. Usually, customers outsource all electronics manufacture to one or several EMS partners. Another clear trend is for customers increasingly demanding the manufacture of box build products”

Enligt Q2-rapporten ser vi följande fördelning mellan affärsområdena Industrial, Communication, Medtech, Defence, och High end Customer.dadadada.PNG

2019 stood alltså Industial för över hälften av omsättningen, och för H1 verkar de vara cirka två tredjedelar. Jag ser det som positivt att försvarssektorn är en liten del, och ser inga större problem med segmenten eller fördelningen mellan dem. Dessvärre verkar man inte redovisa vilken del av rörelseresultatet varje del svarar för, vaken i kvartalsrapporten eller senaste årsredovisningen. Dessutom hittar jag ingen ingående beskrivning på varje affärsområde.

Beskrivning av caset

NOTE ser ut att vara en industri-compunder av rang, med hög lönsamhet och relativt hög tillväxt. Dessutom beskriver man själva att man tjänar på trenden att europeiska företag vill flytta produktion från Kina till Europa. Det är en utveckling som gör att NOTE bör ha medvind, och att tillväxten kan bibehållas utan större marginaltapp.

Bolagets Kvalité

De senaste 5 åren har omsättningen per aktie ökat med ca 12%, EBITDA ökat med 26% och snitt ROIC är 27%. De senaste åren ser onekligen mycket bra ut. Dock har man flera dåliga år den senaste 20-årsperioden. Det är främst i spåren av finanskrisen NOTE haft dåliga år, även på en ebitda-nivå. Enligt årsredovisningen 2010 genomförde man en nyemission och avyttrade flera anläggningar samt viss omstrukturering. Efter 2011 ser utvecklingen onekligen fläckfri ut.


Balansräkningen i Q2-rapporten 2020 verkar helt rimlig, skuldsättningen verkar sund, och det finns inte allt för mycket immateriella tillgångar att tala om. Inget att anmärka på med andra ord. Nettoskuld mot ebitda är mycket lågt på under 0.5, och soliditeten är rimliga 42%.

Av detta drar jag slutsatsen att bolagets kvalitet är hög, vilket den senaste utvecklingen i roic och rörelsemarginal visar.


Givet bolagets kvalitet tycker jag bolaget kan handlas till en värdering i linje med evebitda/oms-tillväxt = 1, dvs EVEBITDA ~11-12. Jag tycker med andra ord bolaget är ungefär rimligt värderat.



NOTE är ett fint bolag som handlas till en rimlig värdering. jag tror bolaget kan komma fortsätta utvecklas i liknande takt som vi sett sedan 2010. Bolaget pekar i senaste rapporten på en viktig utveckling som NOTE bör påverkas positivt av. Nämligen trenden att flytta tillverkning från Kina till Europa. Detta är vad som gör caset intressant, och detta gör att jag ser positivt på NOTEs framtida utveckling. Det gäller att man har den finansiella flexibiliteten och stabiliteten att ta vara på denna möjlighet. Jag tycker inte mig se några problem vad gäller balansräkningen eller den finansiella styrkan att klara av detta.

Sammanfattningsvis kan man säga att NOTE är ett billigt industribolag med potential för god framtida tillväxt flera år framöver. Risken ligger främst i huruvida en liknande utveckling som åren efter finanskrisen kan upprepa sig. Något som iallafall hittills kan minska sannolikheten för det scenariot är hur bra man presterat i svallvågorna av corona-krisen. Med det sagt tycker jag NOTE är ser ut som ett bra bolag till en bra värdering.


Veckans Screening 12/7-2020

Denna veckas screening återgår jag till att screena som vanligt, dock exkluderat de branscher jag inte är intresserad av.

Lite intressant är dock hur många bolag som sållas bort i varje steg. Min screener på börsdata släpper igenom 334 olika bolag (ej justerat för eventuella dubbelnoteringar eller flera aktieslag). Sållar sedan bort bolag med alldeles för hör evebitda genom tillväxt i ebitda, 316 bolag kvar. Efter jag tar bort de branscher jag personligen inte är intresserad av, mer om det här (Har dessutom exkluderat konsultbolagen), har vi 209 bolag kvar. Tycker listan på de 209 bolagen generellt har mycket intressant, nedan är de 50 bolag som relativt är bäst på både pris och roic.

Äger vissa av dessa, och detta är inga råd eller rekommendationer. Nästa vecka kanske vi tar någon specifik bransch eller sektor. Tills dess, simma lugnt!

Bolagsnamn EV/EBITDA – Senaste EBITDA – År. tillv. 5 år ROC – Snitt 5 år
Fab Form Industries 5,8 32,7% 88,1%
Ferronordic 4,2 31,8% 57,1%
Muehlbauer Holding 6,0 53,1% 49,6%
Incap 5,9 52,8% 49,4%
Better Collective 22,9 52,6% 253,2%
Genesis IT 2,6 9,5% 56,4%
AirIQ 5,0 20,2% 47,9%
Awardit 13,6 27,0% 219,7%
Novotek 5,8 16,6% 54,1%
QSC AG 1,2 21,3% 29,6%
Arista Networks 17,2 37,3% 82,0%
Kimball International 4,2 14,8% 40,2%
Namsys 11,8 20,3% 831,7%
Power Integrations 12,9 32,1% 36,9%
Criteo 1,4 13,9% 23,3%
CTT Systems 14,5 27,3% 53,5%
Drillcon 3,4 24,4% 23,8%
Xpel 21,2 40,1% 45,8%
Yirendai 1,7 19,4% 21,7%
Canada Goose 15,0 52,5% 26,5%
Funkwerk 8,4 40,3% 22,5%
Teqnion 5,6 29,6% 22,3%
Malibu Boats 8,8 28,1% 27,2%
Johnson Outdoors 9,2 22,8% 29,2%
Verbio Vereinigte BioEnergie 5,5 16,3% 26,2%
Facebook 19,6 31,8% 44,1%
Great Canadian Gaming 5,7 26,2% 21,3%
Secunet Security 34,7 39,0% 143,6%
ProfilGruppen 5,7 29,6% 20,8%
National Beverage 15,2 16,7% 100,1%
Mips 68,0 106,2% 37,3%
Autohome 21,3 22,1% 266,7%
Fuling Global 2,8 12,9% 20,0%
Atkore International 6,0 27,1% 20,0%
Solaredge Technologies 28,6 53,3% 28,9%
Evolution Gaming 52,8 55,0% 109,1%
Kambi 18,3 24,0% 45,3%
Euronet Worldwide 9,7 15,2% 32,1%
G Willi Food 8,1 43,1% 17,8%
Geodrill 3,2 9,9% 18,4%
PVA TePla 12,7 46,2% 17,9%
Aptiv 6,5 17,5% 18,4%
Beta Systems Software 7,3 33,5% 16,5%
Microsoft 24,3 21,8% 66,4%
Mensch & Masch 20,1 25,6% 27,3%
Fabrinet 12,9 20,4% 22,4%
Universal Display 33,4 34,5% 38,6%
Europris 8,2 17,5% 18,6%
Installed Building Products 12,6 23,7% 18,1%
Mastec 5,4 38,8% 13,8%

Veckans Screening, miljöbolag. 05/07-20

Såg denna fantastiska Kurzgesagt-video om miljöproblemet häromdagen, och det fick mig att fundera. Vi måste globalt ersätta fossil energi med förnybara källor. Såklart börjar jag titta på vilka bolag som är noterade, och vilka som är möjliga att investera i.

Denna veckas screening tänkte jag fokusera på bolag inom Solenergi, vindkraft, bioenergi, och förnybar energi.

Denna filtrering är mer förlåtande än den vanliga screenern, nedan beskriver jag kriterierna:

  1. Info, Bransch: Solenergi, Vindkraft, Bioenergi, förnybar energi
  2. EV/EBITDA: > 0
  3. EBIT-marg: > 6%
  4. ROC snitt senaste 5 år: > 7
  5. Nettoskund mot EBITDA < 4

Så enkelt kan det vara att sålla bort bolag med för låg lönsamhet, och för hög skuldsättning. Följande 10 bolag kommer igenom denna screening.

Bolagsnamn Info – Bransch EV/EBITDA – Senaste EBITDA – År. tillv. 5 år EBIT-marg – Snitt 5 år ROC – Snitt 5 år N.skuld/Ebitda – Senaste
Renewable Energy Bioenergi 1,7 na 9,9% 27,2% 0,1
FutureFuel Bioenergi 2,2 9,6% 21,8% 45,0% -3,4
CropEnergies Bioenergi 5,7 na 9,3% 15,6% -0,1
Verbio Vereinigte BioEnergie Bioenergi 4,9 16,3% 8,0% 26,2% -0,6
Green Plains Partners Bioenergi 5,3 23,8% 60,0% 10,3% 2,4
Daqo New Energy Solkraft 213,3 19,5% 26,3% 15,0% 2,1
Solaredge Technologies Solkraft 25,5 53,3% 14,3% 28,9% -2,0
Canadian Solar Solkraft 6,7 -1,4% 7,3% 18,1% 3,8
Vestas Wind Systems Vindkraft 12,3 2,5% 10,1% 100,2% -0,9
Orsted Vindkraft 16,1 0,5% 23,2% 12,8% 1,2

Av dessa har jag igår kollar på några, främst Solaredge och Canadian solar. Ni kan läsa twitterdiskussionen ang dessa här. Är dessutom intresserad av både Vestas och Ørsted.

Jag överväger starkt en position i de fyra bolagen jag nämnde, och ska kolla de andra som syns i denna lista. Skriv gärna om dessa är några bolag du kollat på eller är intresserad av, och pinga gärna mig @ValueTeddy.

Hoppas denna installation av Veckans Screening varit intressant, och hoppas vi tillsammans kan överkomma problemet med utsläpp av växthusgaser.

Over and out.

Veckans screening 28/06-2020

Veckans screening, fjärde i serien. Denna screening är ganska uppdaterad från senast, förändringarna är i stora drag följande:

  1. Användning av relativ ranking
    1. Ranking på lägst EVEBITDA/EBITDA-tillväxt och ranking på högst ROIC
  2. Filtrering av vissa branscher
  3. Även inkluderar även USA och Canada

Relativ ranking i screening

Först, lite annorlunda metodik från vad jag tidigare använt i denna screeningserie, och som jag visat i mina videor på hur jag screenar. Jag har denna gången valt att använda relativ ranking i denna veckas screening, på samma sätt som Joel Greenblatt konstruerat magic formula. Det funkar på det viset att man sorterar bolagen enligt en faktor, i detta fall EVEBITDA/EBITDAtillväxt, och ROIC. Sedan tilldelar man den som presterar bäst i listan 1 poäng, näst bäst 2, tredje 3 och så vidare. Summerar man sedan poängen och sorterar listan på den summerade poängen får man en lista på aktier som sammanlagt “presterar bäst” i rankingen.

Det jag försöker fånga i denna metod är främst tre delar, Värdering, Tillväxt, och Lönsamhet. Värderingsmåttet och tillväxtmåttet får vi genom EVEBITDA/tillväxt i EVEBITDA. Högre tillväxt eller lägre värdering ger ett en bättre multipel. Lönsamheten fångar vi genom ROIC.

Fördelen med denna metod är att den är otroligt enkel, och givet en del basfiltrering bör listan med bolag vara ganska intressant. Sånt jag filtrerat bort är för hög skuld mot EVEBITDA, låg marginal, och låg ROIC.

Dessutom har jag valt att i denna screenern exkludera en del branscher, vilka vi kan kolla lite på nedan. Dessa är branscher som jag normalt sett exkluderar när jag letar bolag att investera i.

Olja och gas, samt Mining

Dessa exkluderas på grund av att de är vad jag kallar råvarubolag. Hit hör bolag vars huvudsakliga verksamhet är helt beroende av priset på en eller flera råvaror. Anledningen till att jag exkluderar dessa är att jag misstänker att deras intäkter, och således deras framtida lönsamhet, ligger i händerna på råvarupriset, och således inte inom deras egna makt. Dessa bolag kan såklart jobba med kostnader och smarta investeringar, men i slutändan sitter man i händerna på råvarupriset.

Vård, Skola, Omsorg

Dessa exkluderas eftersom de verkar på en OTROLIGT reglerad marknad. Om vi sätter den politiska frågan huruvida vård skola och omsorg ska vara privat, åt sidan, så sitter dessa i knä på politiken. Dessa påverkas extremt mycket av enstaka politiska beslut, och det är så klart väldigt problematiskt. Den här kategorin har även den otroligt farliga snedvridna incitamentsstrukturen som leder till att det är orimligt lönsamt att ta genvägar för att minska kostnaderna.

På grund av överhängande politiska risker avstår jag även från samtliga bolag inom försvarsbranschen.

Både denna kategori och råvarubolagen har samma karaktärsdrag som jag starkt ogillar. Deras framgång nämligen ligger inte i deras egna händer. Råvarubolagen är för starkt beroende av råvarupriserna, och vård skola och omsorg är helt beroende på politiska beslut.

Too hard pile

Här hamnar sånt jag inte med en rimlig arbetsmängd kan få en önskvärd förståelse för industrin och branschen. För mig är detta främst hälsovårdssektorn. Dvs Medicin, biotech, medicinsk utrustning, och så vidare. Såklart finns det dom som kan dessa branscher, men jag känner inte att jag har tillräckligt bra koll för att kunna sätt mig in i bolagen.

Finansiella bolag

Detta är främst bank och fastighetsbolag, och dessa exkluderas helt enkelt eftersom de inte passar bra att analysera dem med samma mått som andra bolag. Den största problematiken handlar om skuldsättningen, som generellt sett är mycket högre i finansiella bolag, dels eftersom de använder mycket mer kapital, men främst eftersom de använder helt annat kapital än ett bolag inom tillverkningsindustrin. Finansiella bolag passar bäst att analysera för sig.

Värt att notera är att jag är helt okej med att investera i underleverantörer till dessa industrier, dock beroende på hur stor del av omsättningen som kommer från dessa industrier eller branscher.


Nedan är de bolag som presterar bäst i denna veckas screening. Jag hoppas detta leder till några intressanta case att investera i, och jag hoppas ni kan ta något intressant från detta. Dela gärna de bolag ni tycker är intressanta och pinga mig @ValueTeddy. Har nu lite semester, så kommer antagligen vara sist på bollen på alla nyheter. Håll tillgodo, over and out.

Bolagsnamn Info – Bransch evebitda/ebitdagr ROC – Snitt 5 år
Fab Form Industries Byggmaterial 0,17 88,1%
Ferronordic Industrikomponenter 0,13 57,1%
Incap Industrimaskiner 0,11 49,4%
Veteranpoolen Bemanning 0,30 551,7%
Genesis IT Affärs- & IT-System 0,26 56,4%
AirIQ Telekomtjänster 0,22 47,9%
Novotek Affärs- & IT-System 0,28 54,1%
Better Collective Betting & Casino 0,38 253,2%
QSC AG Bredband & Telefoni 0,06 29,6%
Jerash Holdings US Möbler & Inredning 0,26 44,0%
Awardit Marknadsföring 0,44 219,7%
Kimball International Bygginredning 0,29 40,2%
Teqnion Industrikomponenter 0,11 25,8%
Arista Networks Kommunikation 0,45 82,0%
Criteo Marknadsföring 0,07 23,3%
Drillcon Gruv – Service 0,13 23,8%
Power Integrations Elektronik & Tillverkning 0,38 36,9%
Yirendai Internettjänster 0,10 21,7%
Muehlbauer Holding Elektroniska komponenter 0,40 37,6%
Funkwerk Kommunikation 0,21 22,5%
Namsys Affärs- & IT-System 0,63 486,1%
Canada Goose Kläder & Skor 0,28 26,5%
Diadrom IT-Konsulter 0,60 96,3%
Softronic IT-Konsulter 0,43 36,0%
Malibu Boats Bil & Motor 0,31 27,2%
CTT Systems Installation & VVS 0,54 53,5%
CAG Group IT-Konsulter 0,50 45,6%
Verbio Vereinigte BioEnergie Bioenergi 0,30 26,2%
Johnson Outdoors Fritid & Sport 0,39 29,2%
ProfilGruppen Industrikomponenter 0,18 20,8%
Facebook Internettjänster 0,54 44,1%
Great Canadian Gaming Betting & Casino 0,22 21,3%
Xpel Bil & Motor 0,56 45,8%
Solaredge Technologies Solkraft 0,43 28,9%
Atkore International Elektroniska komponenter 0,22 20,0%
Fuling Global Hemelektronik 0,22 20,0%
Etteplan Affärskonsulter 0,27 20,7%
KnowIT IT-Konsulter 0,44 26,3%
Mips Fritid & Sport 0,59 37,3%
Autohome Internettjänster 0,79 266,7%
G Willi Food Livsmedelsbutiker 0,19 17,8%
Kambi Betting & Casino 0,66 45,3%
Secunet Security Affärs- & IT-System 0,83 143,6%
Euronet Worldwide Betalning & E-handel 0,63 32,1%
Beta Systems Software Affärs- & IT-System 0,21 16,5%
Evolution Gaming Betting & Casino 0,84 109,1%
PVA TePla Elektronik & Tillverkning 0,28 17,9%
Geodrill Gruv – Service 0,32 18,4%
Time People Group IT-Konsulter 0,89 318,4%
Aptiv Bil & Motor 0,36 18,4%
Fabrinet Elektronisk Utrustning 0,57 22,4%
BTS Group Affärskonsulter 0,63 24,0%
Mastec Byggnation & Infrastruktur 0,15 13,8%
Sleep Country Canada Möbler & Inredning 0,34 16,7%
Datagroup IT-Konsulter 0,30 15,4%
AQ Group Industrikomponenter 0,28 14,8%
Installed Building Products Byggnation & Infrastruktur 0,48 18,1%
Patrick Industries Byggmaterial 0,41 16,2%
Holmen B Skogsbolag 0,12 12,9%
Hexatronic Elektroniska komponenter 0,45 16,7%
LGI Homes Bostadsbyggnation 0,39 15,2%
Smart Sand Byggmaterial 0,04 12,4%
Tucows Internettjänster 0,63 20,9%
Savaria Installation & VVS 0,42 15,7%
Mensch & Masch Affärs- & IT-System 0,80 27,3%
Brdr. Hartmann Förpackning 0,46 16,7%
Herman Miller Bygginredning 0,70 22,1%
Solteq IT-Konsulter 0,22 13,0%
Toromont Industries Industrimaskiner 0,64 19,5%
Balco Group Byggmaterial 0,62 18,0%
Nordic Waterproofing Byggmaterial 0,44 15,1%
Sweco B Affärskonsulter 0,57 16,8%
VBG Industrikomponenter 0,32 13,4%
FM Mattsson Installation & VVS 0,53 16,1%